Tag Archive for: PASSPORT APPLICATION

HIGH COURT DECISION RELATING TO REVOCATION OF AN EU RESIDENCE CARD AND THE IRISH PASSPORT OF MINOR CHILD

HIGH COURT DECISION RELATING TO REVOCATION OF AN EU RESIDENCE CARD AND THE IRISH PASSPORT OF MINOR CHILD

HIGH COURT DECISION RELATING TO REVOCATION OF AN EU RESIDENCE CARD AND THE IRISH PASSPORT OF MINOR CHILD

Ms Justice Phelan of the High Court has delivered judgement in the case of AKS v the Minister for Justice [2023] IEHC 1, which addresses the impact of the Supreme Court judgement U.M ( a minor) v Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade and Ors [2022] IESC 25.

The facts in the AKS case arise from the decision of the Minister to revoke a permanent residence card to the parent of an Irish citizen child on the basis of an allegation of fraud. The decision of the Minister was to find that the EU Fam Residence card was revoked in its entirety on the basis of fraudulent conduct. It was submitted by the Applicants in this case that the 2015 Regulations do not permit retrospective revocation and furthermore that a revocation of an EU Fam residence card to the parent of an Irish citizen child, does not impact that child’s right to Irish citizenship. The Applicants also argued that the review process under the 2015 Regulations does not sufficiently meet the procedural safeguards and protections required by Directive 2004/38/EC.

In following the Supreme Court judgement UM, which arose in the context of revocation of refugee status of a parent rather than an EU Fam residence card, Ms Justice Phelan held that “Neither the 1956 Act nor any other law identified to me or by me provides for the denationalisation of a citizen by birth.”

Judge Phelan further confirmed that The 2015 Regulations make no provision for the acquisition or loss of citizenship and that the 2015 Regulations, properly construed, do not provide for a power to retrospectively nullify vested citizenship rights of a non-party child,  

Judge Phelan held:

Neither Regulation 27 or 28 of the 2015 Regulations provide in express terms for a retrospective nullification of permissions which have issued on foot of false or misleading information or by reason of a marriage of convenience. Indeed the provisions of Regulations 27 and 28 are couched in the present tense both as regards a permission which “is being relied upon” and a marriage which “is” a marriage of convenience (as opposed to a post-divorce situation where reference would be made to the marriage in the past tense). It is also clear that the Regulations do not mandate the revocation of a permission that “is being relied” upon but they empower revocation by providing for a discretion (“may”) to revoke. This is in contrast with the language used in the 2006 Regulations where revocation was mandatory.

In contrasting the facts of UM and AKS, Ms Phelan concluded that in both contexts the relevant legislation did not envisage retrospective revocation where derived rights are impacted:

It seems to me that the starting point should be that the principle of prospective operation of legislation and legislative provisions should apply when interpreting the provisions of the 2015 Regulations and that it is appropriate to approach those Regulations on the basis that they are not to be presumed to permit retrospective alteration of the legal nature of past conduct and events affecting an acquired status unless clear words are used, mindful of course that the 2015 Regulations, as transposing Regulations, also require to be interpreted in a manner which gives effect to the Directive. It is clear from UM that the concept of retrospective nullification affecting acquired status while not outlawed in theory is considered by the Supreme Court to be generally unsuited to the public law context, and particularly unsuited to addressing historic immigration status and derived rights and requires a clear legal basis. 

In relation to the Minister’s power to revoke the residence permission of the applicant, with the impact of the revocation only impacting his own position, and not the position of his minor child, the Court concluded:

Contrary to the First Respondent’s asserted understanding of her powers, it does not follow from a finding of fraud or marriage of convenience that a residence permission will be automatically revoked. While it is an open question as to whether the First Respondent had been vested with a power to retrospectively revoke the Second Applicant’s EU residence rights, it is nonetheless clear that any power was discretionary and therefore fell to be exercised in a proportionate manner having due regard to affected rights and interests.

If you have been impacted by these important issues, Please contact Berkeley Solicitors for advices.

REFUSAL OF NATURALISATION APPLICATION ON GOOD CHARACTER GROUNDS OVERTURNED BY HIGH COURT

REFUSAL OF NATURALISATION APPLICATION ON GOOD CHARACTER GROUNDS OVERTURNED BY HIGH COURT

Mr Justice Garrett Simons of the High Court has recently delivered a judgement in the case of A.J.A v Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 162 JR.

The case concerned a refusal of an application for naturalisation.

The application was refused on the grounds that the Applicant did not meet the good character criterion under Section 15(1)(b) of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956. The Applicant was found to have submitted a potentially false Somali passport with her application.

The Applicant subsequently issued judicial review proceedings in the High Court to challenge the decision to refuse her application for a certificate of naturalisation. This was the second set of judicial review proceedings issued by the Applicant in respect of her application for naturalisation. The Applicant had issued judicial review proceedings in 2021 challenging the delay in processing her application. These proceedings were struck out of the High Court in January 2022, following the issuance of a decision on the Applicant’s application in December 2021.

The primary issue that was considered in the second set of judicial review proceedings was whether fair procedures had been observed in the Minister’s decision-making process.

The Applicant submitted her application for naturalisation on the 29th May 2017. On the 6th November 2017, the Applicant’s solicitors submitted a letter to the Minister that highlighted the Applicant’s concern as to the genuineness of the passport that she had submitted with her application. On the 10th May 2018, the Applicant’s solicitors sent a further letter to outline attempts made by the Applicant to have a new Somali passport issued. The Respondent then sent a letter in response, confirming that a thorough investigation was required as to the genuineness of the Applicant’s passport.  It was the Applicant herself who proactively contacted the Minister in relation to this issue and confirmed that she had always acted in good faith in respect of her application for a passport and in respect of her application for naturalisation.

The Applicant was ultimately successful in the High Court on the grounds that the Minister’s decision did not consider the Applicant’s explanation nor the exculpatory factors at issue.

Mr Justice Garrett Simons found that submission of the Minister did not meet the prescribed standard of fair procedures as it failed to acknowledge the explanations offered by the Applicant in respect of her passport. Ms Justice Garrett Simons found that, “The omission from the submission/recommendation of an accurate record of the explanation and exculpatory factors is fatal to the validity of the decision made.” The Court further found that the Minister’s decision did not meet the legal test for the adequacy of reasons.

The Court acknowledged that the submission of a false passport is an extremely serious issue and could of course legitimately give rise to a decision to refuse an application for Irish citizenship by way of naturalisation. The Court found that it was the manner in which the decision was made that was problematic, it was not clear whether the Applicant’s explanation that due to the circumstances in Somalia and the lack of Government, she could not confirm if her passport was valid or not,  had been provided to the Minister when the decision to refuse was made. The Court held that “The failure of the respondent in the present case to take the basic step of identifying the precise documents which had been submitted to the ultimate decision-maker is regrettable”.

The Minister of Justice’s decision to refuse the Applicant’s naturalisation application was quashed. The Court held:

 

  1. The submission/recommendation in the present case failed to meet the prescribed standard of fair procedures. The principal deficiency is that the submission/recommendation fails to record, even in the most cursory form, the explanations offered by the Applicant, through her solicitors, for the submission of the false passport. There is no reference to the practical difficulties asserted by the Applicant in obtaining a passport from Somalia given what is said to be the absence of a functioning central government there. Nor is there any reference to the efforts made by the Applicant to travel to the Somali Embassy in Belgium for the purpose of obtaining a passport. Although these events occurred after the submission of the false passport, they are, 13 arguably, indicative of the practical difficulties which a Somalia national, who has been long-term resident in the Irish State, faces in obtaining a passport from that country

The full judgement can be found here.

This blog article has been prepared on the basis of current immigration law and policy, which is subject to change. Please keep an eye on our blog and Facebook page where articles relating to updates and changes in immigration law and policy are regularly posted.

HIGH COURT DECISION RELATING TO REVOCATION OF AN EU RESIDENCE CARD AND THE IRISH PASSPORT OF MINOR CHILD

SIGNIFICANT SUPREME COURT DECISION- REFUSAL TO ISSUE IRISH PASSPORT TO MINOR CHILD BORN IN IRELAND

The Supreme Court have delivered a very significant judgement in the case of U.M ( a minor) v Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade and Ors.

U.M is a minor child, born in Ireland on 1st June 2013. UM’s father is a citizen of Afghanistan, who was granted a declaration of refugee status on 14th July 2006, having arrived in Ireland on 22nd April 2005.

UM’s father in 2012 returned to Afghanistan and returned to the State at a time when his Stamp 4 registration had lapsed. His fingerprints were taken at Dublin airport and were found to match with the identity of another person, who had been refused refugee status in the United Kingdom in 2004.

UM’s father subsequently received a decision from the Minister for Justice revoking his refugee status, on the basis that he had returned to Afghanistan and had not given truthful information in his asylum application. UM’s refugee status was revoked pursuant to the Minister’s powers under the now repealed Section 21(1) of the Refugee Act 1996. Under the International Protection Act 2015 revocation of refugee status must take place where various circumstances arise, the Minister no longer has a discretion as she did have under the 1996 Act. The 2015 Act also confirms the revocation will have prospective effect. UM’s father’s refugee status was revoked with effect from 31st August 2013. UM’s father did not appeal the Minister’s decision.

An Irish passport application was submitted for UM in 2014, a decision was made to refuse this application on 11th June 2014 and a request for a review of this decision, affirmed the initial decision by decision dated 17th November 2014.

This decision was challenged by way of Judicial review proceedings and a declaration was sought from the Courts that UM is an Irish citizen.

Section 12 of the Passport Act 2008 outlines that the Minister shall refuse to issue an Irish passport if the Minister is not satisfied that person is an Irish citizen.

Entitlement to Irish citizenship is in turn governed by the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act1956 (as amended).

Section 6A of this Act outlines that children born in Ireland to parents who are not Irish or British citizens will be entitled to Irish citizenship at birth only if one or either of their parents have at least three years reckonable residence in the island of Ireland in the four year period prior to their birth. Residence in the State for the purpose of study, for the purpose of seeking asylum or residence that is in breach of Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 2004 (As amended) is not reckonable for this calculation. By default, all other permissions are reckonable.

Within Section 5(1) of the 2004 Act there are specific types of permission which are excluded from the remit of Section 5, including those persons who have a refugee declaration in place.

UM’s case was lost in the High Court. The Minister for Justice argued that for permission to be reckonable for the purpose of Section 6A, it must be lawful and bona fides residence and not obtained by fraud. The applicant argued that the specific residence permissions excluded from reckonable residence are only those specifically excluded under Section 6B. The Applicant argued that his father’s refugee status was revoked from the date of the decision, and this was in fact stated on the decision and was not void from the outset. The Court acknowledged that there had been no wrongdoing on the part of the applicant, a minor child, but did not grant UM the relief of quashing the refusal decision, nor was the court prepared to make a declaration that UM was an Irish citizen.

The case was appealed to the Court of appeal, who issued their decision on 11th June 2020 The Court of Appeal held that there was a key question in the case- is permission obtained fraudulently reckonable or non-reckonable for the purposes of the 1956 Act? The Court found that it was not permissible for the Minister to add in a requirement not found in the legalisation – that for permission to be reckonable it must be lawful and bona fides. For residence not to be reckonable, it must be specifically excluded in the Act. Therefore the Court of Appeal went on to assess whether UM’s father’s permission within the relevant period was in breach of Section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 2004. The Court of Appeal found that the permission of UM’s father during this period was in breach of Section 5(1)- the Court of Appeal found that the Court must look behind the permission held, to the deceit upon which it was grounded.

UM appealed his case to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that the key question is whether UM’s father’s refugee declaration was “in force” for the relevant period.

UM argued that the revocation of his father’s refugee status had prospective effect, from 31st August 2013, as was stated on the decision itself. UM highlighted that the power to revoke refugee status under Section 21(1) of the Refugee Act 1996 was a discretionary power and the Minister had a discretion as to whether to proceed to revoke MM’s refugee status or not in spite of any potential grounds for revocation. The Minister argued that in the same way a declaration of refugee status has a date, the declaration does not confer the refugee status, only recognises its existence, therefore the revocation decision recognises the refugee status never existed in the first place. The Court of Appeal held that “fraud unravels everything”.

The Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission acted as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court proceedings. They argued that any system resulting in nullification of citizenship should include procedural safeguards and an assessment of the impact of such an action of impacted parties. UM also argued that the Minister was required to carry out a proportionately assessment in relation to the decision that would ultimately result in UM’s loss of citizenship. UM further argued that even if the decision of the Minister to revoke MM’s refugee status was retrospective, this did not make his residence in the relevant period in breach of Section 5(1), as the refugee declaration and the permission (Stamp 4) are separate and distinct from one another.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal, that it was not permissible to add a requirement that residence be lawful and bona fides for it to be reckonable.

In examining whether a decision to revoke refugee status renders the declaration void from the outset, the Supreme Court examined various scenarios and held it is difficult to reach a definitive answer and in fact it would depend on the facts leading to revocation and the timing of those events. The Court found that the Minister has a discretion to revoke and does not have to revoke, would therefore result in a conclusion that in most cases the revocation would be from the date of revocation and not from the date the events occurred.

The Court looks at various scenarios and highlights the difficulty in establishing the legal position for persons who obtain derivative rights through the permissions of others, which were fraudulently obtained. The Court highlights difficulty that flows from situations where there was a finding of nullity resulting in a deprivation of citizenship of those claiming a derivative right to citizenship.

In allowing UM’s appeal The Supreme Court concludes:

To all intents and purposes, the declaration of refugee status was valid and effective for all purposes while it remained unrevoked. If the Minister had decided
not to revoke, as it appears could have been the case having regard to the discretion given to the Minister in s. 21 (1), then, that would have meant that the declaration would have remained in force notwithstanding the circumstances in which it was obtained.
Given the status of the declaration until such time as it was revoked I find it difficult to conclude that in holding the declaration was void
ab initio, as was found by the Court of Appeal. It was valid, binding and of effect until revoked

The Court highlighted the difficult position that arises for persons, particularly children, who derive a right from the existence of a right of their parents and are then a risk of losing that right due to cancellation/ revocation of their parents’ right. The Court commented that even if a permission is void ab initio, as was found not to be the case in this instance, there are further questions as to the rights of those who hold derivate rights.

It may well be that the declaration is void ab initio, but there may be a limit to the consequences of such a conclusion. The Court further notes that …invalidity is a relative and not an absolute concept

This is an extremely important decision and as the Supreme Court itself has recognised –“The acquisition or loss of citizenship is a matter of profound significance for the individual concerned”.

Berkeley Solicitors is of the view that this judgement is likely to have a far reaching impact in relation to decisions made to cancel Irish passports for Irish children, following revocation of their parent or parents’ EU fam residence cards.

PROCESSING TIMES FOR FOREIGN BIRTH REGISTRATION

PASSPORT SERVICES TO BE CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL UNDER NEW PLANS BROUGHT TO CABINET

Today, new proposals will be brought to Cabinet by the Minister for Foreign Affairs which will deem the production of passports an essential service.

The majority of passport services have been suspended since December in line with the Level 5 restrictions.

It is planned that the Minister will ask the Cabinet to consider passport services an essential service in order to allow the backlog to be efficiently cleared.

Approximately 89,000 people have been affected by delays in the processing of passport applications including 44,000 domestic applications and 45,000 from outside the State.

The issuing of a passport to Irish citizens is provided for under the Passports Act 2008 which states:

‘a person who is an Irish citizen and is, subject to this Act, thereby entitled to be issued with a passport.’

Berkeley Solicitors therefore believes that the failure to issue passports to Irish citizens is contrary to this Act.

This matter is of great concern and Berkeley Solicitors has received many queries from those who have been unable to receive a passport for travel or identification purposes.

In deeming the production of passports an essential service, it is hoped that this backlog can be cleared in a matter of weeks.

Berkeley Solicitors are happy to see this news today and we hope that it will benefit those who have been affected.